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Introduction
Liberty, Legislation, and Litigation of Religious 
Freedom: The Connecticut Law Review Symposium
EMILY GAIT & STEPHANI ROMAN
In 2017, the Connecticut Law Review hosted the symposium “Religious 
Freedom: Liberty, Legislation, and Litigation.” The symposium set out to explore 
three specific areas of debate within the conversation about the federal Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA): (1) liberty—the right to be free to exercise your 
religion without a substantial governmental burden; (2) legislation—how RFRA 
laws vary from state to state and what challenges exist in balancing competing 
interests through the legislative process; and (3) litigation—cases that arise within 
the employment law field, constitutional civil rights cases, and the notion of a 
corporation’s right to free exercise.  This Introduction summarizes the arguments 
of several of the symposium’s contributors and authors in this issue of the 
Connecticut Law Review.

Liberty, Legislation, and Litigation of Religious 
Freedom: The Connecticut Law Review Symposium
EMILY GAIT & STEPHANI ROMAN *
The federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which passed 
Congress in November, 1993, was enacted to “provide a claim or defense to 
persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.”1
The law addressed Congress’ concern that “laws ‘neutral’ toward religion 
may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with 
religious exercise.”2 After the federal RFRA was enacted, federal protection 
for religious freedom continued to face challenges, and the United States 
Supreme Court invalided the 1993 RFRA’s applicability to states in City of 
Borne v. Flores.3 States responded by enacting similar laws mirroring, 
expanding, or contracting the existing federal RFRA,4 which continued to 
apply in the federal context. 
On October 20, 2017, the Connecticut Law Review and the University 
of Connecticut School of Law hosted the symposium “Religious Freedom: 
Liberty, Legislation, and Litigation.” The symposium set out to explore three 
specific areas of debate within the RFRA conversation: (1) liberty—the right 
to be free to exercise your religion without a substantial governmental 
burden; (2) legislation—how RFRA laws vary from state to state and what 
challenges exist in balancing competing interests through the legislative 
process; and (3) litigation—cases that arise within the employment law field, 
constitutional civil rights cases, and the notion of a corporation’s right to 
free exercise. 
This symposium took place before the U.S. Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission.5 However, the debate over rights under RFRA remains largely 
unresolved by this recent decision, which implicated the Free Exercise 
                                                                                                                         
* University of Connecticut School of Law J.C. Candidates 2019. Thank you to Professors 
MacDougald and Spencer for their support, encouragement, and guidance. We could not have been more 
pleased with the energy and enthusiasm that every single panelist and moderator brought forward to make 
this an engaging discussion. Special thanks to the Symposium Committee for putting on the finishing 
touches. 
1 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–141, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
(107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
2 Id.
3 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
4 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. CONST. ART. 1, § 3 (2017).
5 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
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Clause of the U.S. Constitution. While some seek to expand the extent of 
protections for religious beliefs being carried into the public sphere or 
commercial domain, opponents are concerned over the limitations these 
intended protections have on civil liberties for minority groups that are 
repudiated by majority religions. Others argue that the shift from minority 
religions asserting protections under the federal RFRA to majority religious 
groups doing so may not have been anticipated by lawmakers at the time it 
was enacted. In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to not directly 
address whether a service provider’s sincere religious beliefs might have to 
yield to the state’s interest in protecting the rights of same-sex couples,6 the 
applicability of the federal RFRA and the reach of the various state 
analogues will continue to present challenges. 
Speakers at the symposium included legal scholars, journalists, religious 
leaders, and the governor of Connecticut. Discussion focused on an array of 
topics, including conflicts between religious liberty and generally applicable 
work law, the collision between claims of religious autonomy and claims of 
LGBTQ equality in the domain of state law, and Connecticut’s own RFRA. 
This Symposium Issue includes contributions from scholars who attended 
the symposium and graciously contributed their thought-provoking analyses 
to the Connecticut Law Review.
Professor Michael A. Helfand’s contribution focuses on the scope of 
protections for religiously motivated institutions and corporations. Professor 
Helfand has previously proposed an “implied consent” framework for 
addressing religious institutional claims. This framework grounds the 
authority of religious institutions in the presumed consent of their members. 
Professor Helfand argues that consent can be assumed so long as members 
understood the unique religious objectives of the institution when they 
joined. This would implicitly authorize the institution to make rules and 
resolve disputes connected to accomplishing such objectives. Professor 
Helfand proposes that such a framework supports some of the religious 
liberty claims advanced by religious institutions and establishes important 
limits on religious institutional authority and autonomy. Professor Helfand’s 
article summarizes his theory and responds to critiques.
Professor Christopher C. Lund’s contribution is a brief exploration of 
martyrdom and some of the issues it presents. Professor Lund discusses a 
range of subjects, including religious voluntarism, the law of civil contempt, 
some renowned nineteenth century polygamy cases, and some modern cases 
of child abuse and neglect. Professor Lund’s essay touches on history, 
theory, and doctrine. His basic premise is that martyrdom matters, and that 
religious liberty has been and will continue to be shaped by the willingness 
                                                                                                                         
6 Id. at 1732 (observing that “the State’s interest could have been weighed against Phillips’ sincere 
religious objections in a way consistent with the requisite religious neutrality that must be strictly 
observed,” but holding narrowly that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission violated Philips’ First 
Amendment right by acting with hostility towards his sincerely held religious beliefs).
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of people to suffer for their faith. A recurring thought in his essay is that 
religious liberty has a less certain future in a world without martyrdom. 
Professor Charlotte Garden traces the recent history of arguments by 
religiously affiliated colleges and universities that they should be exempt 
from the National Labor Relations Act. Professor Garden considers how the 
legal dispute regarding union organizing at religiously affiliated colleges and 
universities sheds light on the debate over religious liberty for enterprises. 
First, she discusses courts’ difficulties in separating questions regarding 
employer religious liberty from courts’ conceptions of appropriate 
managerial prerogative. Second, she discusses how this particular legal 
dispute demonstrates that some religious exemptions have significant value 
in secular markets and that employers may be able to negotiate 
accommodations that partially compensate employees for the costs they 
incur as a result of those accommodations.
Professor Adrienne Fulco delves into the history of Connecticut’s own 
RFRA. Professor Fulco analyzes the legal and policy concerns that prompted 
Connecticut legislators to first introduce a religious freedom restoration bill 
in 1991 and then pass a very similar version in 1993. Professor Fulco 
scrutinizes the pertinent legislative history to understand the legal, moral, 
and policy questions that were foremost in the minds of Connecticut 
legislators and the witnesses who provided testimony at the time. Professor 
Fulco also considers why a debate about religious freedom, that today is 
politically polarizing, not only provoked little controversy at the time, but 
also took place largely outside of public view.
The Connecticut Law Review is grateful to these authors for their 
participation in our symposium and their contributions to the enduring 
discussion of religious freedom in the United States.
